The Instrumental Value of Beauty
in the Pursuit of Justice
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SIX YEARS AGO PROFESSOR Elaine Scarry published ON BEAUTY
AND BEINGJUST, 1 the manifesto in which she argues that experiencing
beauty impacts us in ways that can assist us in achieving justice. Some
commentators have analyzed Scarry's theory in the abstract, suggesting it represents a new, free standing theory of justice; 2 others
have taken a more limited view, approving of her work's resurrection
of beauty as a category worthy of consideration. 3 The goal here is to
consider Scarry's work differently, in a more instrumental and practical way. The link between beauty and justice that Scarry so gracefully
exposes is grounded in personal experience and effect. She proposes
that the reality of that experience and those effects attune people to
justice. If that is so, then social institutions should encourage artistic
creation and protect beauty. The law is no exception.
This practical suggestion has yet to be acted upon, let alone articulated. As already noted, theories of justice typically are relegated
to the realm of the metaphysical. The same is true of beauty. 4 How-

ever, some theories of beauty and art, and even justice, have been
convincingly tied to human experience. John Dewey's ideal of art as
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experience 5 and Simone Weil's theory of justice 6 are two examples
that fit nicely with a pragmatic interpretation of Scarry's work. Taken
together, these three philosophies provide a utilitarian underpinning
for laws that promote and protect beauty, which are often supported
by vague or unsatisfying rationales. The Scarry-Dewey-Weil triad also
establishes a consequential norm. If there is too little justice in our
communities, perhaps we need to provide more beautiful things and
surroundings for those who live and work nearby as a means of improving the public good.
This is not an article about legal aesthetics in the tradition of
those such as Pierre Schlag, 7 who explore the aesthetic qualities of
various schools of legal thought and practice. Neither is it an essay
about the dark side of aesthetics and its legal consequences, 8 or the
generally positive aspects of aesthetics. 9 Rather, it addresses the qualities of beauty that theoretically promote justice and the policy implications of that thesis. John Costonis, who has written prolifically in the
field of aesthetic regulation, tells us that "we are condemned to come
to terms with aesthetics, whether we like it or not." 10 Unlike that sentiment, this Article is not a grudging acknowledgment of aesthetics, but
instead reaches out to three experience-oriented theories to craft a
positive and practical justification for those laws that protect and promote beauty in its natural and human-made forms.
After a summary of Scarry's work and a discussion of Dewey's
complementary thought, this Article will address beauty's connection
to justice with a focus on the writings of John Rawls and Weil. The
organic conception of beauty and justice that emerges will then be
considered in relation to a handful of laws, among them nuisance, the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), and the National Foun5. See generallyJOHNDEwEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE (1934), portions reprinted in SELECTED
READINGS IN AESTHETICS, supra note 4, at 577-646.
6.

(1998).
7.
8.

See generally RICHARD H.

BELL, SIMONE WEIL: THE WAY OF JUSTICE AS COMPASSION

See Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1047 (2002).
See, e.g., Desmond Manderson, Health and the Aesthetics of Health-An HistoricalCase

Study, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 85 (1994) (detailing how appeal to aesthetic

judgments led to government-sanctioned discrimination against the Chinese in nineteenth
century Australia).
9. See, e.g., James Charles Smith, Law, Beauty, and Human Stability: A Rose Is a Rose Is a
Rose, 78 CAL. L. REV. 787 (1990) (reviewing JOHN J. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS: LAw,
AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

(1989)).

10. John Nivala, ConstitutionalArchitecture: The First Amendment and the Single Family
House, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 291, 304 (1996) (quotingJoHNJ. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS:
LAW, AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

15 (1989)
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dation on the Arts and Humanities Act in order to shed light on
beauty's utility in the quest for justice.

I.

Beauty and Justice-Scarry's Connection

In her book, Professor Scarry carefully demonstrates how various
characteristics of beauty, and more particularly our experience of
beauty, assist us in achieving justice.' I She tells us that the totality of
beauty's impact instructs and inspires us in ways that enable us to re12
spond to injustice.
This remarkable result occurs not only because of the qualities
that make something or someone beautiful, but also because of our
reactions to those qualities. Things that are aesthetically pleasing are
symmetrical; they have a sense of proportion and harmony. 13 To
Scarry, this balance exists in faces, works of art, even laws.' 4 Far more
important to her, however, are the ways in which observers respond to
aesthetic proportion.
Scarry describes how beauty both inspires and requires us to create and imitate things of beauty.' 5 Our desire to see beautiful things
causes us to bring new things of beauty into existence.' 6 At the same
time, beauty is life-saving, in that it makes the observer's existence
"more vivid, animated.., worth living.' 7 Not only are we personally
enriched when we experience a beautiful object, but the object itself
18
takes on a life of its own, which in turn makes us want to protect it.
The result is a life-giving/life-saving compact between the beholder
and the object of beauty.
11. SCARRY, supra note 1, at 80, 90-91, 93. The link between beauty and justice is not
as easily seen by other scholars. Theologian Walter Brueggemann, writing about the Old
Testament, points out that Israel is directed to listen to Yahweh's commands and is obligated to do justice. WALTER BRUEGGEMANN, THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT: TESTIMONY,
DISPUTE, ADVOCACY 421 (1997). Israel is also invited to gaze upon Yahweh's "presence,
holiness, and beauty." Id. at 425 (citing SAMUEL TERRIEN, THE ELUSIVE PRESENCE: TOWARDS
A NEW BIBLICAL THEOLOGY (1978)). Brueggemann believes that there is a tension between
the obligations to do justice and to gaze on the beauty of Yahweh, although he feels they
can be practiced in a complementary manner. See id. at 429.
12. ScARRY, supra note 1, at 62.

13.
14.

Id. at 97-99 (finding support in the writings of Plato, Boethius, and Augustine).
Id. at 46. All of these things are beautiful, as are scenic vistas, poems, and attractive

buildings. This Article, however, focuses on the law's ability to further the aims of'justice by
protecting natural beauty and art in general.

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 24-25.
See id. at 80, 88-90.
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Experiencing beauty also inspires deliberation. When we observe
a beautiful thing we initially delight in the object, but the mind soon
begins to search for things to which the object can be compared.1 9
This search brings the mind back in time as it searches for "precedents," even to a point without precedent, or to the immortal and
truth. 20 Throughout this search we confront errors we have made in
21
earlier aesthetic judgments, making the process deeply personal.
A final way in which beauty impacts us is through radical
decentering, which refers to beauty's ability to dissipate self-centeredness. When our gaze falls on a thing of beauty we are no longer at the
center of the world. 2 2 But rather than ignoring everything and everyone surrounding us (a phenomenon known as "lateral disregard"),23
this decentering makes us want to share beauty's benefits laterally, to
distribute its goods. 24 While we may initially (and involuntarily) focus
exclusively on a beautiful object, what follows is a voluntary extension
of our attention to others. We become more perceptive of those
around us and are urged to distribute the benefits of beauty25 and to

26
make beauty accessible to society at large and future generations.
How, then, do these qualities of beauty lead to justice? It is some27
what difficult, after all, to think ofjustice as beautiful in the abstract.
The connection is all the more odd given the fact that beauty, of late,
has been shunned by the humanities and deemed politically unwor-

thy. 28 Yet Scarry refutes those trends and securely links her concep-

29
tion of beauty to Rawls's theory of justice as fairness.
Relying on etymological evidence, she initially takes some time to
demonstrate that the word "fairness," so often associated with justice,
19. Id. at 29-30.
20. Id. at 30-31.
21. See id. at 52.
22. Id. at 111, 113-14.
23. Id. at 80-81.
24. Id. at 66-67, 80.
25. Id. at 81-82.
26. Id. at 117-19. Scarry states that, if asked, people would want beauty in the world,
not just for themselves but for others, now and in the future. Id. at 117-18.
27. Id. at 103, 106. Scarry points out, however, that justice can be beautiful when it
occurs in specific instances, such as in a town meeting. See id. at 103.
28. Scarry discusses (and refutes) the arguments that beauty distracts us from society's
ills and can lead to its own destruction. Id. at 68-71. She also demonstrates that the two
political arguments against beauty are contradictory. Both arguments claim that beauty is
undeserving of attention, but one does so because beauty is natural, the other because it is
artifactual. Id. at 78-79.
29. Id. at 93, 97.
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30
is derived from ancient words that carried aesthetic meanings.
Scarry also traces the word to roots that mean to fit, to join, and pact,
concluding that "fairness" is an amalgam of the aesthetic and the ethi-

cal. 3 1 However, the link between beauty and justice runs deeper.

Scarry argues that the life-saving/life-giving exchange we enjoy
when experiencing beauty3 2 leads us to care for the item observed as

well as the aliveness of others. 3 3 She points out that the lateral sharing
inspired by beauty-its distributional consequence-combines with its
life-saving/life-giving qualities to foster justice. As she explains, an experience with a beautiful object
begins within the confined circumference of beholder and beheld
who exchange a reciprocal salute to the continuation of one another's existence; this two-member salute becomes, by the pressures against lateral disregard, dispersed out so that what is
achieved is an inclusive affirmation of the ongoingness of exisresponsibility for the continuity of
tence, and
34 of one's own
existence.
Scarry thus builds upon the human reaction to beauty to find an
impulse for ethical response. In doing so, she also makes use of
beauty's sense of proportion: "[B] eautiful things give rise to the notion of distribution, to a lifesaving reciprocity, to fairness not just in
the sense of loveliness of aspect but in the sense of 'a symmetry of
everyone's relation to one another."' 35 Not only are justice and beauty
marked by harmony, but beauty's symmetry assists us in discovering
36
the balance and equality that are the hallmarks of justice.
Scarry also suggests that beauty's creative impulse urges us to imitate and replicate, which can inspire us to create institutions and
laws. 3 7 She additionally draws an analogy between the pleasure we ex-

perience from beauty's decentering and the satisfaction we feel as citizens who live in fair societies. 38 There are also similarities between
Rawls's three types ofjustice and various creative approaches, and between the intergenerational equity concerns of both beauty and
39
justice.
30. Id. at 91-92.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 89-90.
33. Id. at 90. "Beauty seems to place requirements on us for attending to the aliveness
or... quasi-aliveness of our world, and for entering into its protection." Id.
34. Id. at 92.
35. Id. at 95.
36. See id. at 97.
37. Id. at 115.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 116, 123.
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The implications of ON BEAUT' AND BEING JUST are many. The
work might herald an altogether new theory ofjustice, as suggested by
Professor Ethan Leib. 40 If so, it is a radical departure from Rawlsian
concepts and most other political thought, which begin with abstractions. 4 1 While Leib admits that metaphysical theories ofjustice are not
without their critics, he also exposes the difficulties inherent in a theory based on aesthetics.

42

Beauty's subjectivity, in particular, makes it a difficult starting
43
point for a theory of justice, since consensus may be hard to reach.
In addition, the dissection of beauty into various components and an
emphasis on symmetry in particular "scientizes" beauty. 44 Leib also

notes that Scarry fails to adequately address the possibility that some
visions of beauty might lead to political regimes that we would find
45
abhorrent.
It is clear, however, that Scarry offers a unique starting point for
her theory. Unlike Rawls's hypothetical original position, Scarry begins with the human experience of beauty.4 6 Leib seems attracted to a

factual starting point, since it addresses a shortcoming of Rawls's fictive account. 47 Nevertheless, Leib accuses Scarry of unevenness, claiming that she, occasionally, slips into the metaphysical, despite her
contention that her theory is not speculative. 48
Ultimately, Leib admits that Scarry's work may represent something more modest than a new theory of justice. Perhaps she merely
wants to say that beauty can assist us in achieving justice. 49 If this is so,
Leib fails to see the lasting value of her work, since numerous metaphysical arguments end up at the same place. Moreover, if Scarry's
theory is viable it does little to deal with practical political problems,
such as deciding how best to achieve the distributional aims of
50
justice.
Professor James Torke, a colleague of Scarry, views her work differently. Like Leib, Torke acknowledges that Scarry's starting point is
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
ESSAYS

48.
49.
50.

See Leib, supra note 2, at 151.
See id. at 152.
See id. at 155-56.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 162.
Id. (referring to the "Nazi" aesthetic).
Id. at 163.
See id. n.53 (citing Frank I. Michelman, How Can the People Ever Make the Laws?, in
ON REASONS AND POLITICS 145, 170 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997)).
Id. at 164-65.
See id. at 166.
See id. at 166-68.
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factual and accepts her recitation of the effects of one's personal experience with beauty. 5 1 He agrees that the attributes of beauty-object, experience, and imitation-stir an ethical impulse that makes
justice accessible. 52 But he believes that Scarry may be telling us something more, that beauty not only assists us in coming to justice, but "is
necessary to and determinative of justice. 15 3 The force of Torke's suggestion is significant, since it warns us that we will not know justice
unless we first know beauty.5 4 In this light, Scarry succeeds in elevating
55
beauty to a category relevant to political thought.
Scarry's account, then, casts beauty either as the foundation of
justice or an indispensable component of justice. A more modest interpretation, which both Leib and Torke briefly consider, is adopted
here. Rather than being the sine qua non of justice, Scarry may be telling us that beauty has the potential to help society on its journey toward justice, one person at a time. Our personal experience of beauty
can prepare us to do justice in very real ways.
II.

Experience and Artistic Creation-Dewey's Connection

An interesting counterpoint to Scarry's theory of beauty and justice is John Dewey's philosophy of art. In his classic work, ART AS EXPE56
Dewey theorized that art emerges from the environment and
RIENCE,
life events experienced by the artist5 7 and that the artist's work reflects, and even thrives upon, the ebb and flow of life. 58 At first glance,
these ideas seem unconnected to Scarry's understanding of beauty.
Dewey's beliefs emphasize the front-end of artistic beauty-the artist's
creative impetus-while Scarry focuses on beauty's aftereffects-the
experience of beauty's beholder. Still, both theories are sited in the
realm of experience, which aligns them in an important way.
Dewey's argument succeeds in grounding art, plucking it from
abstraction. In some sense, his thesis validates Scarry's theory by lending support to her factual account of beauty. Dewey understood artistic beauty as a product of real life, and Scarry tells us that beauty is
real, with real consequences. To Scarry, the beauty of an art object
51. See Torke, supra note 3, at 326, 327. Yet, unlike Leib, Torke feels Scarry does not
adequately deal with beauty in the abstract. Id. at 326.
52. Id. at 329.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 333.
56. DEWEY, supra note 5.
57. See id. at 579.
58. Id. at 588-89.
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arises from the reality of life and inspires us to imitate, to share, to
desire order and symmetry in our world. Together, Dewey and Scarry
see artistic beauty as a medium between an artist's moment in time in
a particular environment and an onlooker's experience. Scarry takes
the point further, by arguing that beauty's impacts have the ability to
inspire justice in the beholder.
Dewey knew well that his artistic ideal was not reflected in early
twentieth century America. The housing of art in museums rendered
it unimportant to the vast majority of people. 59 Artists, too, were isolated; rather than working amidst people and the rough and tumble
of life, they labored alone in studios, engaged in pure self expression.
Dewey saw the art of his day as individualistic and remote, peripheral
to the immediate world and increasingly dedicated to the goals of nationalism and capitalism.

60

Dewey sought to resurrect the link between ordinary and aesthetic experience by embracing the continuity between aesthetic experience and the "normal processes of living." 6 1 This Darwinian
conception of art recognizes the dependency of the artist's creative
urge on the biological cycle of harmony and discord. 62 His view of art
as experience imbues artistic beauty with an immediacy that springs
from the natural rhythm of life. Experience is "art in germ,"6 3 and art,
in turn, "concentrate [s] and enlarge Es] an immediate experience"
64
through imaginative expression.

Only briefly did Dewey contemplate the impact of art grounded
in experience. He saw a power in the artistic beauty he conceived, one
that could unleash possibilities of human behavior that could not be
achieved by laws or other institutions. 65 With this provocative thought,
Dewey edges toward Scarry. He saw, in the organic artistic beauty he
66
envisioned, a force that could change human relationships.
59. Id. at 581.
60. Id. at 584.
61. Id. at 585.
62. Id. at 588-90. Dewey wrote that the cycle of balance and counterbalance presents
a dynamic pattern of life that generates "esthetic experience." Id. at 590. Dewey's "mature"
philosophy and functionalism were heavily influenced by Darwin. Id. at 577 (editors' introductory note).
63. Id. at 592.
64. Id. at 642. Umberto Eco suggests that Dewey's naturalistic philosophy owes much
to the insights of medieval aesthetics. See UMBERTO Eco, ART AND BEAUTv IN THE MIDDLE
AGES, 118-19 (1986).
65. DEWEY, supra note 5, at 645-46. Dewey describes the power of art as "liberating
and uniting." Id. at 646.
66. Id.

Winter 2006]

VALUE OF BEAUTY

It is true that Dewey's work focuses exclusively on artifactual
beauty and may appear to have no bearing on the beauty that exists in
the natural environment, a beauty that Scarry certainly acknowledges.
Yet Dewey never dismissed natural beauty; his affinity for the biological arguably would prevent him from doing so. Instead, Dewey naturalized art by recognizing it as the product of the balance and beauty
of nature as well as the artist's cultural surroundings. Artistic beauty is
steeped in experience, and natural beauty is one of the things that
feed human experience. In some sense, then, natural beauty is relevant to Dewey's thinking.
Both Scarry and Dewey understand beauty as a conduit between
everyday experience and a better place. The beauty in art, often inspired by natural beauty, is something very real and organic, with qualities that make justice possible. Once beauty is seen in this way, as
immediate and effectual, its legal utility becomes more apparent.
IHl.

Scarry, Rawls, and Weil-the Justice Connection

To accept the premise that art is experience and facilitates justice
begs the question, "Which conception of'justice are we talking about?"
There are as many possibilities as there are theories of justice, but
three will be considered briefly with a goal of finding a fit with the
complementary visions of Dewey and Scarry.
A.

Beauty as the Source of Justice
Some have suggested that Scarry intends to offer her own theory

of justice, one that sees beauty as the sole means to an end.6 7 If so,

beauty becomes the source of justice, the single underpinning of political theory, 68 and assumes priority as a "first philosophy." 6 9 This
view, however, is riddled with problems. As Leib maintains, Scarry's
suggestion of our absolute need for beauty moves her from the factual
into the world of "metaphysical moralisms." 70 She strays again when
she depicts an original position from which foundational decisions are
71
made regarding beauty.
More pointedly, it is difficult to square the idea of a stand alone
theory of justice with Scarry's own language, which tells us repeatedly
67.
68.
69.

70.
71.

See
See
Id.
Id.
Id.

supra text accompanying notes 40-50.
Leib, supra note 2, at 152.
at 155-56, 158.
at 165.
at 166.
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that beauty assists us in coming to justice. 72 Her frequent allusions to
Rawls is yet another reason to reject the idea that she seeks to promote her own aesthetic theory of justice. Nowhere in her text does
Scarr state that beauty is the first and only philosophy of justice,
and-even if she did-the practical implications of her theory would
73
raise concerns.
Beauty, then, is not justice's raison d'ftre but is instead something that helps us move toward justice in very important ways. This
more realistic reading of Scarry provides the opportunity to consider
whether other theories of justice support an instrumental perspective
of the beauty-justice connection.
B. Justice as Fairness
It is possible that Scarry does not care to pin her theory to any
particular conception ofjustice but simply seeks to relate her thought
to the dominant view of justice in the twentieth century. She may,
then, have discussed Rawls's philosophy because of its popularity
rather than its uniquely good fit with her thesis. At the very least,
Scarry's reference to Rawlsianjustice suggests that she feels her theory
is aligned with justice as fairness to some extent. While her linkage
with Rawls succeeds at some level, it is not altogether persuasive.
In A THEORY OFJUSTICE, 7 4 John Rawls presents his acclaimed conception of justice as fairness, a justice that results from choices made
by individuals operating under a veil of ignorance in a hypothetical
76
original position. 75 Rawls's decision makers act with mutual respect
and seek to maximize reciprocal advantage. 77 The principle of equal
basic liberties and the difference principle are the result. Rawls believes that in a just society people will cooperate and agree to a minimum social entitlement to resources that will enable each person to
become a responsible citizen. 7 8 To him, the ultimate goal of social
72.

Id.

73.

Id. See supra text accompanying note 50.
(1971) [hereinafter THEORY OF JUSTICE].
75. See generally id. ch. 3 § 24. The original position is an "initial status quo" from
which fair agreements can be reached. Id. at 17. It is also an ahistorical position where all
parties are rational, equal, and free to make suggestions. Nothing and no one is ranked,
and all operate under a veil of ignorance. Id. at 19.
76. Thomas Nagel, Rawls and Liberalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 63
(Samuel Freeman ed., 2003) [hereinafter CAMBRIDGE COMPANION].
77. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 74, at 178-79.
78. Samuel Freeman, Introduction:John Rawls-An Overview, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION, supra note 76, at 9. Rawls's two principles provide that all people have equal basic
liberties, and that any social and economic inequalities that exist must result from a system
74.

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
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justice is a fair arrangement that "maximize [s] the worth to the least
79
advantaged of the complete scheme of equal liberty shared by all."
Stability and a sense of justice are key to Rawls's vision. The
human motivations that cause us to "develop sincere attachments towards persons and institutions that affirm our good" help stabilize society. 80 This emotive reciprocity is psychologically driven, arising from
feelings of love, friendship, and caring.8 1 These same motivations cul82
tivate a sense of justice, which also assures a stable and just society.
Over time, Rawls modified his theory, but he never wavered from
the ideals of reciprocity and mutual respect. What changed was his
conception of the actors in his just society. He came to see them as
citizens who tolerate one another's diverse fundamental moral
views.83 Justice is now politicized, achieved by the "overlapping consensus" of citizens with reasonable but differing religious and moral
beliefs.8 4 Although different viewpoints are acknowledged, mutual respect prevails in the realm of public reasoning, where arguments must
be based on reason.8 5 Rawls now sees that a myriad of "comprehensive
views" can support a sense ofjustice and stability.8 6 His two principles
of justice remain, but they operate within a pluralistic setting.8 7 This
liberal evolution in Rawls's thought yields a macro theory of justice
8
that applies to entire societies and their institutions.1
Rawls's hypothetical original position and veil of ignorance have
their critics. Feminists charge that he ignores emotions and relationships, which can make positive contributions to justice.8 9 Martha Nussbaum has accurately dispelled this argument by pointing out that
of equal opportunity and must "be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members
of society." Nagel, supra note 76, at 66 (citing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 5-6
(1993) [hereinafter POLITICAL LIBERALISM]).
79. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 74, at 205.
80. Freeman, supra note 78, at 24.
81. Id. at 24 (citing THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 74, at 473-74). Here Rawls draws
upon the Aristotelian psychological principle that tells us that we are driven to use our
talents at an increasingly higher level; thus, citizens in his well-ordered society will strive to
act in ways that further the ends of his conception ofjustice as fairness. Id. at 26-27 (citing
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 74, at 86).
82. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 74, at 454; see also Freeman, supra note 78, at 22.
83. Freeman, supra note 78, at 33. Rawls's modified theory appears in his 1993 work,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM.

84.

Id. (citing POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 78, at 44).
85. Nagel, supra note 76, at 75-77.
86. Freeman, supra note 78, at 34-35, 37.
87. Id.
88. See Nagel, supra note 76, at 63.
89. Martha C. Nussbaum, Rawls and Feminism, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION, supra note
76, at 488-90.
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Rawls takes emotion into account in a serious way, in particular in his
belief in society's sense of justice. 90 In that portion of his thinking he
invokes "principles of moral psychology"9 1 that derive from parental
love and "fellow feeling," 92 and he admits that we cannot push those
93
feelings aside "without disfiguring ourselves."
Somewhere within the psyches of the decision makers in his hypothetical state, Rawls sees an emotive impulse that feeds a sense of
justice and, in turn, a stable society. Yet his reference to emotions is
not enough to deter other critics. Liberal communitarians oppose
Rawls's highly individualistic view and his failure to recognize people's
special ties to community and place. They favor a less "atomistic" and
more holistic form of liberalism that runs counter to Rawls's
94
teaching.
Scarry does not criticize Rawls. In fact, she repeatedly aligns her
views on beauty and justice with fairness in the Rawlsian sense. 9 5 What
makes this connection initially appealing is her etymological analysis
of the word "fair," in which she links the "fairness" Rawls endorses
with her concept of beauty. 9 6 Yet this demonstration and her other
references to Rawls make clear that her beliefs are more a supplement
to, rather than a replacement for, Rawlsian justice. When discussing
justice, she speaks of someone else's theory, not her own. Scarry might
well accept the idea that a sense of justice as fairness arises from
Rawls's original position, but that is not the point of her book. Instead, she sets out to explain how beauty helps us achieve that conception of justice. It is a force that awakens in us the life-saving,
distributional, and imitative urges that invigorate our sense of justice
97
in the Rawlsian tradition.

If she wished, Scarry could have tied her theory to Rawls in other
ways. Her belief in beauty's ability to inspire lateral distribution and
symmetrical imitation are consistent with Rawls's difference principle,
as is her position regarding intergenerational accessibility to beauty.
90. Id. at 490-91.
91. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 74, at 491.
92. Id.
93. Martha C. Nussbaum, Rawls and Feminism, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION, supra note
76, at 491 (quoting THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 74, at 489).
94. BELL, supra note 6, at 34-35.
95. See ScARRY, supra note 1, at 115-16 & n.27 (referring to Rawls's three visions of
justice, the original position of equality injustice as fairness, and the duty ofjustice (citing
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 74, at 83-87, 12, 115)).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
97. Torke interprets Scarry in a similar fashion. See supra text accompanying note
51-52.
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One might suggest that the radical decentering that results from an
experience with beauty lends support to Rawls's second principle as
well. In addition, beauty's ability to engage us in a search for truth in a
deliberative way arguably prepares us for the give and take that occurs
in Rawls's domain of public reasoning.
While all of these attributes of beauty are in harmony with Rawlsian justice, there is a troubling dissonance. The very personal, emotive, and real experience of beauty that Scarry depicts seems a
mismatch for a vision ofjustice that emerges from a fictive position of
neutral parties who make decisions in forced ignorance. Even if we
acknowledge Rawls's understanding of emotions, he still puts them to
use in an artificial setting. Further, some of the qualities of beauty that
Scarry champions, in particular its ability to spark a beholder's imitative, cooperative, and protective urges, do not square with Rawls's first
principle of individual rights and liberties. The majority of Scarry's
effects suggest outreach rather than self-preoccupation.
The less than perfect fit with Rawls becomes more pronounced
when Scarry's ideas are supplemented by Dewey's philosophy, which
ties the creation of artistic beauty to experience in a complex and very
real environment. His vision underscores Scarry's focus on the immediate and real experience of beauty and points towards a utilitarian,
rather than a metaphysical, application of Scarry's work. Once art and
beauty are perceived as factual and contextualized, and understood as
enabling us to come to justice, it is difficult to conceive of that end as
an abstraction, born from a fictive, unknowing status quo. An experiential conception of art and beauty begs for a more organic conception of justice.
C.

Justice as Compassion

Simone Weil offered such a theory, one that stands in sharp contrast to Rawls's liberal political philosophy. 98 Like Rawls, Weil relies on
the metaphysical, but she situated her theory with the divine rather
than a sterile original position. And while Rawls focuses on fairness,
Weil asks us to think of justice as compassion.
For Weil, justice is a "new virtue" of caring that holds the promise
of legal and social transformation. 99 It is active, arising directly from
98. BELL, supra note 6, at 34. Weil's thinking, which was heavily influenced by Greek,
Chinese, and Buddhist philosophers, is closely aligned with communitarians, virtue
ethicists, and feminists. Id. at 88, 96.
99. Id. at 37.
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interpersonal relationships within communities. 10 0 It occurs when
God awakens the spirit of justice that dwells within us, enabling us to
act compassionately toward those who are worse off than we. 1 1 Weil
eschewed rights-based theories ofjustice and emphasized the value of
life; 10 2 her work is devoid of economic theory, which she believed was
detrimental to the common good. 0 3 She accepted the reality of social
inequality and even considered it necessary for justice to impose
itself.10 4

Key to Weil's thinking are the concepts of divine love, attention,
consent, and rootedness. Her love is immediate and personalized,
lived and practiced within one's community to achieve justice. 10 5 It is
a "mad love" that originates from God, becoming "manifest within
and through human action by attention, renunciation, and fellowlove."1 0° 6 Her justice is revealed in individual acts of compassion toward those who are afflicted and is only made possible with divine
0 7
help. It is a one-on-one justice springing from the supernatural.1
Divine intervention occurs only when two conditions exist: attentiveness to those in need and consent to the reality of divine love.
Attention is a skill that demands selflessness and the ability to discern
what others experience.' 0 8 It requires one to empty all thoughts of self
and lose oneself in the plight of those who suffer. 0 9 Attending -to
others is only possible with consent, which is a personal agreement to
receive God-given love. It requires trust in God and the acceptance of
God's intervention to ignite acts of compassion and justice. 110 Only
when we become selfless, by attending to others, is there room for
consent."'
100.

Id. at 38.

101.
Id. at 74. In addition to love of others, Weil also recognized a love based on friendship. Between friends there is equality and respect of individual autonomy; between one
and an afflicted neighbor necessity and compassion are key. Id. at 64 (citing SIMONE WElL,
FIRST AND LAST NOTEBOOKS 128 (Richard Rees trans., 1970)).

102.

Id. at 39-41.

103.

Id. at 36.

104.

Id. at 63.

105.

Id. at 207-08.

106.

Id. at 60-61.

107.

See id. at 130 (referring to "face to face contact among those who share some

common environments").
108. Id. at 46-49 (citing Weil's essay, Human Personality). Weil believed that attention
toward others is a skill that must be learned. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 51-52, 57.
111. Id. at 57 (citing Simone Weil, Are We Strugglingfor Justice, PHIL. INVESTIGATIONS,
Jan. 1987, at 53 (Marina Barabas trans.)). Weil was one among a number of thinkers who
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A final precondition to Weilian justice is rootedness, which refers
to the special relationship each of us has with our community and
with others. Rootedness is highly contextualized, evolving from life's
activities and spiritual sensibilities. Families, professional activities, religion, education, and other social experiences help root us. 1 2 By ex-

periencing these life connections in various milieus, we learn about
friendship and respect and become attuned to our culture.1 13 And,
importantly, we become sensitized to those in distress." 4 Rootedness
builds a bottom-up morality in a society full of connections and
115
readies us for the work of justice.
The core, then, of Weil's justice is the practice of acts of compassion between individuals, made possible by their rootedness in community, attention to the cries of the afflicted, and consent to
supernatural intervention. 1 16 If these preconditions are met, God be7
stows the love that fuels acts of compassion."
It is important to recognize beauty's contribution to Weil's
thought. In a general way, Weil's compassion bears similarities to
18
beauty. Both are uplifting and recognize a spiritual universal order,'
19
and like beauty, Weil's God-inspired justice is harmonious.
More
pointedly, Weil alludes to the importance of beauty in helping us become rooted. She notes that life's rituals are often marked by
beauty, 120 as are other beautiful things that exist in the web of enviwrote of divine love. For example, Reinhold Niebuhr, the prodigious Protestant theologian
of the twentieth century, recognized a similar type of "self-sacrificial love," one that required a "selfless identification with the needs of others." KAREN LEBACQZ, Six THEORIES OF
JUSTICE 83-84 (1986). Unlike Weil, however, Niebuhr believed such love and the hope of
perfect justice was an earthly impossibility due to the reality and pervasiveness of sin. Id. at
84-86.
112. BELL, supra note 6, at 103-04, 123 (citing SIMONE WEIL, THE NEED FOR ROOTS 43
(Arthur Wills trans., 1971)).
113. Id. at 125. Weil explains that rituals of all kinds help us become rooted by providing a sense of community and of the sacred. Id. at 134-35.
114. Id. at 134-35.
115. Id. at 78.
116. See id. at 57, 61. Indeed, her justice is beyond our control. Id. at 61.
117. Weil believed that legal systems should be the bridge between the human and
spiritual spheres. Laws should bind us together by way of obligation and should guide us in
fulfilling our obligation to one another, but should not get in the way. Id. at 113, 115, 117.
She would have law schools teach students that there is a difference between asking "Why
am I being hurt?" and "Why has somebody else got more than I have?" and instruct them
that the first question is the one that matters. See id. at 118 (citing SIMONE WEIL, SELECTED
ESSAYS 30 (Richard Rees trans., 1962)).
118. See id. at 62.
119. See id. at 61.
120. Id. at 134-35.
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ronments in which we live. The cumulative beauty to which we are
exposed helps to connect and root us in our worlds. 12 1 Weil was
keenly aware of the need for people to be attentive to beauty and to

respond to

it.122

The contrast between Weil and Rawls could not be more dramatic. Weil's conception ofjustice has nothing to do with the fair distribution of goods; instead, it focuses on making people fair and
just.1 2 3 Rawls's fairness is symmetrical and horizontal, and Weil's compassion, which is so dependent on cosmic intervention, is asymmetrical and vertical. 1 24 Rawls considers human equality a given and
human rights of paramount importance; Weil, however, requires inequality and concentrates on obligation. 125 The character of social institutions is important to Rawls, yet Weil would be far more concerned
with the character of the people in charge of those institutions.1 26 Perhaps the most crucial distinction between the two is the initial setting
of their theories. While Rawls's original position is free of context,
Weil's justice begins with individuals who are deeply rooted in their
127
communities.
As distant as Weil's compassion is from Rawls's fairness, it bears
an important similarity to Dewey's theory of art. Her concept of
rootedness arises from an environment much like the surroundings
that are crucial to Dewey's idealized art experience. To Weil, one's
unique existence within a community makes one attentive to others;
to Dewey, that same contextualized existence feeds the artistic urge.
Both believed that the public good is served by individual relationships with, and connections to, people, environments, and the circumstances of life. This understanding complements Scarry's theory and
strengthens the argument for an instrumental conception of beauty
and justice.
Scarry's discussion of Rawls in a book designed for mainstream
reading is understandable, since his theory is near canonical in the
West and beyond.' 28 However, as has been shown, there are difficul121.
122.

Id. at 138.
Id. at 207-08. In this regard, Weil saw nature's beauty as sacred. Id. (citing SIMONE
WEIL, WAITING FOR GOD 166 (Emma Craufurd trans., 1951)).
123. Id. at 54.
124. Id. at 58.
125. Id. at 82-83.
126. Id. at 71 (citing ANDREA NYE, PHILOSOPHIA: THE THOUGHT OF ROSA LUXEMBURG,
SIMONE WEIL, AND HANNAH ARENDT

127.
128.

122 (1994)).

Id. at 80-81.
Freeman, supra note 78, at 1.
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ties with her alignment with Rawls. More comfortable connections exist between beauty, as understood by Scarry, and Weil's conception of
justice as compassion.
Weil's unquestioned belief in God-given love may seem anachronistic in an age of political correctness and absolute neutrality. Yet the
divine love that feeds acts and compassion is no harder to grasp than
Rawls's original position. The point here is not to debate the worthiness of the origins of their respective theories but rather to emphasize
the contrast between the breadth of Rawls's conception ofjustice and
the far more intimate justice of Weil. When the two theories are distinguished in this manner, Weil's compatibility with Scarry becomes
clear.
Weil's justice, like Scarry's depiction of an experience with
beauty, is immediate, personal, and factual. Both are organic in the
sense that they involve beings in highly contextualized life settings.
This common ground avoids the mismatch between Scarry's theory
and Rawls's abstraction.
There are more similarities between Scarry and Weil besides context. Beauty's ability to radically decenter us, one of the most important features of Scarry's theory, makes us selfless and better able to
attend to others, which is one of the predicates of Weil's justice. Further, as beauty coaxes us to escape from ourselves, we are free to pay
attention to the narratives and environments that surround us, making us more rooted.
Beauty's deliberative effect is also consistent with Weil's compassion. The search for precedents and the divine that beauty triggers is a
process that can prepare us for consent and the gift of love and compassion. Beauty's life-saving and life-giving qualities and the protective
and imitative stimuli they engender also facilitate compassion by urging us to act on behalf of the afflicted.
As the potential of beauty's role in Weilian justice is revealed, the
instrumental value of beauty becomes apparent. Dewey's grounding
of artistic beauty in experience makes the utility of Scarry's theory
even more apparent. Not only do beauty's properties help us to become rooted and attentive, but Dewey suggests that beautiful objects
are rooted in a highly contextualized personal experience in the first
place. The inspiration for the creation of a work of art, one's experience with that object of beauty, and the resulting urges yield a more
immediate, interpersonal justice. The entire process-the creation of
beauty, beauty itself, and its positive impact on justice-begins with
the individual and community.
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Scarry's thesis is better seen as a pivotal piece of an intimate philosophy of artistic beauty and justice than as a macro-theory of justice
in the tradition of Rawls. Her work illuminates the importance of, and
connections between, the human environment and artistic creation,
the experience of beauty, and justice. Dewey and Scarry tell us that
both the creation and impact of beauty are situated in human experience, and Weil tells us that justice can begin at the same place. The
integration of these three philosophies has practical implications for
law and policy.
IV.

Aesthetic Regulation, Nuisance, NEPA, and the NEAthe Law Connection

The utility of beauty in the pursuit of justice is its ability to prepare us to appreciate justice, and perhaps to act justly. That utility
suggests that the law should both protect and promote beauty in ways
that make it accessible to as many people as possible. There are a
number of opportunities for the law to carry out this task; however,
this discussion will highlight aesthetic regulation and nuisance, NEPA,
and the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act, the
latter of which establishes the National Endowment for the Arts
("NEA"). These legal instruments promote and protect beauty yet,
with a rare exception, none of their stated policies even hint at the
possibility that beauty, on its own, is supportive of justice.
The choice of these laws is admittedly motivated by the author's
personal bias in favor of policies that protect cultural and environmental resources. By no means do they represent the sole candidates
for an infusion of the beauty-justice connection. Nevertheless, this selective discussion suffices to demonstrate, in a few discrete ways, how
beauty's latent power can be tapped to further the work of justice.
A.

Aesthetic Regulation and Nuisance

The positive externalities arising from aesthetically pleasing surroundings and the ability of the environment to inspire artistic creation have been recognized for centuries.1 29 In the late 1800s Thoreau
wrote of this phenomenon, 30 and by the mid-twentieth century the
Supreme Court expressly recognized the value of attractive neighbor129. See Nancy Perkins Spyke, The Promotion and Preservationof Culture as Part of Environmental Policy, 20 WM. & MARY ENVrL. L. & POL'Y Rv. 243, 244, 254 (1996).
130. Henry David Thoreau, Autumnal Tints, ATLANTic MONTHLY, Oct. 1862, at 387, 396,
cited in Randall J. Cude, Beauty and the Well-Drawn Ordinance: Avoiding Vagueness and Overbreadth Challenges to Municipal Aesthetic Regulations, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 853 (1998).
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hoods.' 3 ' Since that time, aesthetic regulation has proliferated,13 2 and
aesthetic nuisance has become an increasingly recognized cause of action.'3 3 Still, both areas of law struggle with subjectivity,1 34 and local
governments continue to overlook aesthetics as an interest that justi1 35
fies the exercise of the police power on its own account.
Early judicial decisions that upheld aesthetic regulations often
did so on the theory that they preserved property values. 13 6 As such,
the ordinances fell safely within the parameters of the police power.
More recent cases gravitate towards two other rationales, one that
might be termed the "feel good" argument, and another that promotes community stability. Neither rationale is particularly satisfying.
The feel good argument simply recognizes, as Thoreau did, that
37
our visual environment impacts us in direct and significant ways.'
Aesthetically pleasing surroundings enhance our well-being by positively impacting our personality and sense of happiness. 38 It therefore
makes sense to enact laws that aim to make the built environment
more beautiful and to give landowners the right to sue when their use
and enjoyment of land is substantially degraded by a neighbor's unsightly land use practices.
This reasoning is at the heart of the Supreme Court's majority
opinion in Berman v. Parker.1 39 In upholding the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act, Justice Douglas, in often-cited prose, proclaimed
that the public welfare encompasses aesthetic concerns: "The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
140
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
132. Smith, supra note 9, at 790-91; see also Raymond Robert Coletta, The Case for Aesthetic Nuisance: Rethinking TraditionalJudicialAttitudes, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 141, 159 (1987).
133. See, e.g., Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Foley v. Harris, 286
S.E.2d 186 (Va. 1982); Coletta, supra note 132, at 150.
134. See Coletta, supra note 132, at 141-42, 144-45; see also Cude, supra note 130, at 854.
135. Cude, supra note 130 at 911.
136. See, e.g., State ex reL Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 309-10 (Mo. 1970)
(upholding an ordinance that provided, in part, that unsightly structures decreased property values).
137. Coletta, supra note 132, at 142.
138. Id. at 160.
139. 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
131.

140.

Id.
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Although Berman establishes that aesthetic concerns can justify an
exercise of police power, 141 its brief reference to spiritual enrichment
never fully explains why that benefit is worthy of legal attention. This
same shortcoming appears in other cases in which courts summarily
validate aesthetic regulation as furthering the general welfare with oc142
casional references to beauty.
Other writers offer a deeper insight into aesthetic regulation,
claiming that it enhances community stability. This argument has
been presented in depth by John Costonis, who argues that attractive
environments contribute to their inhabitants' psychological and emotional stability in ways that forge a bond between them and their surroundings. 1 43 John Nivala similarly writes that the built environment
"enhance [s] our identity and our understanding of our culture. 1 44
The meanings and values that we derive from our environment are so
significant that our spirits are shaken when our surroundings are al14 5
tered or destroyed.
The psychological impacts of aesthetic regulation and its ability to
stabilize communities offer firmer support for aesthetic regulation
than do vague references to the public welfare and beauty. 14 6 Professor Costonis in particular believes that aesthetic regulation is not really about beauty at all, but rather serves to reassure us that our
communities will remain stable and resistant to environmental
change. 14 7 The substitution of stability for beauty may seem little more
than a redefinition, but if so, it is an expanded definition that pro148
vides aesthetic regulation with a more concrete justification.
Aesthetic nuisance benefits from this same rationale. If our personal and community identities are impacted and stabilized by the
141. By pinning aesthetic regulation to spiritual health, the Court came close to recognizing that aesthetics impact the psychological well-being of a community. If so, those regulations protect the public health in addition to the public welfare. See Smith, supra note 9,
at 794-95.
142. ICONS AND ALIENS, supra note 10, at 78; see also Smith, supra note 9, at 792.
143. SeeJohnJ. Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and Reformulation of the Dilemmas,
80 MICH. L. REV. 355, 430 (1982).
144. John Nivala, Saving the Spirit of Our Places: A View on Our Built Environment, 15
UCLAJ. ENV-rL. L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (1996-1997).
145. Id. at 18. Costonis similarly sees environmental change as threatening and destabilizing. ICONS AND ALIENS, supra note 10, at xv, 1-2; Smith, supra note 9, at 793.
146. See ICONS AND ALIENS, supra note 10, at 79-80.
147. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 9, at 793.
148. See Smith, supra note 9, at 794. Professor Smith ultimately questions Costonis's
suggestions regarding the means of aesthetic regulation claiming that they fail to fully address his stabilization premise. Id. at 797-800. He also questions Costonis's handling of the
inevitable conflict between aesthetic regulation and freedom of expression. Id. at 803-04.
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emotional and symbolic meanings of our visual environment, then we
should be protected if our neighbors use their land in ways that alter
those meanings and threaten our sense of identity. Courts facing aesthetic nuisance claims should recognize the psychological and community values that arise from a stable aesthetic environment. 149 As
they do, they can avoid dealing with the intractable problem of
beauty's subjectivity.

150

The vast majority of the rationales supporting aesthetic regulation and nuisance rely on conclusory references to public health and
welfare, or use a feel good or stability argument. All of these arguments are one-dimensional, limited in the sense that they emphasize
how beautiful surroundings impact us. Only rarely is there a discussion of an active aesthetic response to our surroundings. Those occasional references recognize that we process and shape aesthetic
experiences based on our sociocultural backgrounds,1 5 1 but even
these arguments fail to address how we use those experiences in our
personal lives.
The traditional justifications of aesthetic regulation and nuisance
are convenient but incomplete. The feel good argument largely limits
the impact of beauty to the beholder, and the stability argument,
which adds to the value of aesthetic regulation, nevertheless is restricted to the observer and immediate community. Furthermore, the
occasional acknowledgement that we respond to our aesthetic experiences leaves us to wonder about the nature of the response. Scarry's
theory of justice fills this gap with a more expansive, multi-dimensional justification.
If we apply her thesis to communities with natural and built
amenities of beauty, which are experienced by individuals on a daily
basis, then a new justification for aesthetic regulation and nuisance
presents itself. It becomes possible to argue that those laws, by deterring affronts to aesthetic sensibilities, work in subtle and small ways to
make those communities more just. They have the potential to slowly
build a sense ofjustice in observers one at a time. Aesthetic regulation
and nuisance do not guarantee ajust society; instead, they make possi149. See generally Coletta, supra note 132. Specifically, Professor Coletta argues that
courts should inquire whether a targeted land use is consistent with the aesthetics of the
community, with its "established community patterns and values," using an objective standard. Id. at 161.
150. Id. at 161-62.
151. See id. at 154.
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ble a much more intimate justice, founded on individual experience
and interpersonal relationship.
Aesthetic regulation promotes beautiful surroundings and aesthetic nuisance protects landowners from interference with aesthetically pleasing environments by others. In doing so, those laws allow us
to experience beauty more freely and consistently and provide opportunities for beauty's urgings to feed our sense of justice. The beauty
and order protected by those laws can inspire individuals to imitate
the harmony they experience, make them more deliberate and attentive to others, and make them more likely to engage in small acts of
compassion. Beauty's ability to spark individual tendencies toward justice is as yet an unspoken policy of aesthetic regulation and nuisance,
one that can deepen the justification for those laws.
B.

NEPA and SEQRA

Environmental laws that seek to protect aesthetics could also benefit from a policy of justice. NEPA and state equivalents, such as New
York's State Environmental Quality Review Act ("SEQRA"), are two
examples.
NEPA, a landmark environmental statute enacted at the outset of
the environmental decade, sets forth the nation's environmental policy and requires federal agencies to prepare environmental impact
statements for actions that significantly affect the human environment. 52 It also creates the Council on Environmental Quality
("CEQ") within the executive office of the President. 15 3 NEPA is designed to "foster and promote the general welfare"'15 4 and, in addition
to its concern with traditional environmental media, assures all Americans "esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings."'1 55 CEQ regulations require each environmental impact statement to evaluate
historic and cultural resources, urban quality, and the "design of the
1 56

built environment."

NEPA's aesthetically-oriented policies originated in the Senate
bill and were included in the conference substitute that became
law. 157 The conference report fails to discuss why cultural and aes152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
2768.

42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4332 (2000).
Id.
Id. § 4331(a).
Id. § 4331 (b) (2).
40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(g) (2004).
H.R. REP. No. 91-765 (1969) (Conf. Rep.), as reprintedin 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2767,
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thetic assets were selected for protection. Nevertheless, NEPA leaves
little doubt that natural and built features of beauty are part of the
human environment and are to be protected in order to promote the
general welfare of all Americans. t5 8 To that extent, NEPA echoes the
15 9
language of Berman v. Parker.
In the years following NEPA's passage, many States enacted similar statutes. New York's SEQRA, 160 like NEPA, requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement if agency actions are likely
to result in significant adverse environmental impacts.16 1 Unlike
NEPA's purely procedural directives, however, SEQRA expressly re16 2
quires state agencies to avoid adverse environmental impacts.
SEQRA is clear in its concern for New York's aesthetic assets. It
includes aesthetic amenities in its definition of "environment" 163 and
requires state agencies to deny applications if a project's negative impacts cannot be avoided or adequately mitigated.1 64 Apart from its
goal of stymieing environmental degradation, the statute provides little explanation for its protection of the state's natural beauty. However, courts have not hesitated to uphold permit denials under
SEQRA's visual impact provisions 165 and have recently held that the
statute authorizes the denial of a project application based on visual
166
impact alone.
SEQRA's aesthetic protection provisions raise concerns about
subjective assessments, and its substantive language is not always
158. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a), (b)(2).
159. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
160. N.Y. ENV-L. CONSERV. LAw § 8-0101-0117 (McKinney 1997).
161. See John W. Caffry, The Substantive Reach of SEQRA: Aesthetics, Findings, and NonEnforcement of SEQRA's Substantive Mandate, 65 ALB. L. REv. 393, 395 (2001).
162. N.Y. ENV-rL. CONSERV. LAw § 8-0109(1); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6,
§ 617.11(d) (2000); Caffry, supra note 161, at 394.
163. N.Y. ENV-rL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(6); see also Caffry, supra note 161, at 403.
Washington State's Environmental Protection has also been held to allow discretionary
denials of building permits due to negative visual impacts. See Polygon Corp. v. City of
Seattle, 578 P.2d 1309 (Wash. 1978); see also Nivala, supra note 144, at 24-25.
164. See Lane Constr. Corp. v. Cahill, 704 N.Y.S.2d 687, 688-90 (App. Div. 2000); see
also Caffry, supra note 161, at 397.
165. See WEOK Broad. Corp., v. Planning Bd., 592 N.E.2d 778, 784 (N.Y. 1992); WalMart Stores Inc. v. Planning Bd., 668 N.Y.S.2d 774, 777-78 (App. Div. 1998); see also Caffry,
supra note 161, at 398.
166. See Lane Constr. Corp., 704 N.Y.S.2d at 690, appeal denied, 739 N.E.2d 1145 (N.Y.
2000); see also Caffry, supra note 161, at 399. Visual impact litigation is on the rise in New
York, in part because SEQRA expressly includes aesthetic amenities in its definition of
"environment." N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAw § 8-0105(6) (McKinney 1997); see also Caffry,
supra note 161, at 403.
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treated seriously. 167 Yet, like NEPA, it unquestionably protects things
in the environment that are beautiful. Neither statute, however, provides a satisfying rationale for doing so. Instead, they consider natural
and built things of beauty part of the environment and afford them
protection in order to promote the welfare of the people. Legislators
were likely motivated by the feel good argument; there is little room
to argue that scenic vistas and beautiful historic monuments do not
feed the spirit of those who experience them. It is also likely that
lawmakers recognized that many of the amenities they sought to protect were not only beautiful, but irreplaceable. The threat that some
state-sponsored projects pose to beautiful surroundings is very real
and was likely in the minds of lawmakers. This policy of preservation
distinguishes environmental assessment legislation from aesthetic regulation and nuisance and arguably provides NEPA and similar laws
with a broader rationale.
Nevertheless, the objectives of these laws can be expanded further by considering the instrumental value of the connection between
beauty and justice. The preservation and protection of beautiful vistas
and culturally significant structures is important, not merely because
they are part of the environment, but because they enrich us, or because they might otherwise be lost forever. By preserving their beauty
the law additionally keeps them accessible to observers whose experience will feed their sense ofjustice and perhaps prepare them for just
acts toward others. The added potential of these laws to inspire justice
one person at a time is especially important at a time when NEPA and
SEQRA have been criticized, 168 and NEPA in particular is under
siege.'

C.

69

NEA
The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act 170 pro-

vides another opportunity to consider the utility of Scarry's theory.
The statute, enacted in 1965, sought primarily to address a funding
disparity between science and the arts by establishing a National Foundation ("Foundation") that was charged with establishing a national
167. See Caffry, supra note 161, at 407, 410-11. The Department of Environmental Conservation requires that the staff members who make aesthetic judgments under SEQRA
have some relevant expertise in the area, most often in architecture or landscape architecture. Id. at 407.
168. See id. at 410-11.
169. See, e.g., First Hearings on NEPA Draws Full House, Criticism of Foundation, 36 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 874 (Apr. 29, 2005).
170. 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-976 (2000).
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policy for the arts and humanities. 17t Endowments for the arts and
humanities were established within the Foundation to provide support
for a wide array of artistic activity by groups and individuals, and to
support research, training, and publication of scholarly work in the
humanities. 172 The NEA provides grants to artists and arts organiza173
tions for works that emphasize American creativity and excellence.
The law's legislative intent is well expressed in the House Report,
which describes the uneven support for the sciences and humanities
and refers to the financial crisis then facing the arts. 174 Congress realized that the arts support human knowledge in various ways 175 and
could enrich an American public that was enjoying more leisure time
176
than ever before.
Lawmakers also believed that civilized nations are judged in part
by their contribution to the arts and humanities. 177 More importantly,
they were mindful of the ominous "'cultural offensive' being waged by
Communist ideologies"1 78 and recognized the political and economic
potential in exporting American art and culture. Only a few decades
earlier Dewey had roundly criticized the use of art for nationalistic
and capitalistic gain,1 79 a sentiment that was lost in the politicallycharged Cold War era.
Just three years later, Congress voted to fund the Foundation
through 1970, and as it did, it reiterated its belief that promoting arts
and humanities was a "hallmark of a mature nation."' 80 In its short
history the law had experienced a number of achievements, but it was
clear that more support was necessary.1 8 ' The reauthorization package included amendments that made identical changes to the defini171. H. REP. No. 89-618, at 1, 5 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3186, 3187,
3190. At the time the law was passed, the arts were in the midst of a financial crisis. Id. at 3,
as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3188.
172. Id. at 2, as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3187.
173. 20 U.S.C. § 954 (2000).
174. H. REP. No. 89-618, at 4, 5, as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3188, 3190.
175. The House Report states that "the arts translate into tangible, creative, and abiding form, the scope of human knowledge." Id. at 5, as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3190. The snAtute itself focuses on this idea by proclaiming that the Arts foster democracy,
respect for diversity and multiculturalism, and global respect. 20 U.S.C. § 951 (2000).
176. H. REP. No. 89-618, at 5, as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3190.
177. Id. at 3190 (citing President Eisenhower's 1960 COMMISSION ON NATIONAL GOALS
REPORT).

178. Id. at 3191. Coming as it did during the throes of the Cold War, Congress's desire
to export American art and culture in order to deter Communism is unsurprising. See id.
179. See supra text accompanying note 60.
180. S. REP. No. 90-1103, at 1, as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2090, 2091.
181. Id. at 3, as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A-N. at 2092.
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tions of "the arts" and "the humanities," expanding the meaning of
the terms to include their "study and application .

.

. to the human

82

environment."' The legislative history makes note of the growing belief that that the arts and humanities not only bring beauty to our lives
183
but are pertinent to "social problems.
Like aesthetic regulation, nuisance, and NEPA, the National
Foundation and in particular the NEA, protect and promote things of
beauty. Yet the NEA's objective is unique. It is not so much that things
of beauty make us feel good, stabilize society, or are irreplaceable, but
rather that they say something about our society and serve the political goal of national aggrandizement. Most interesting is Congress's
brief acknowledgement that beauty is relevant to social ills. The legislative history's reference to social problems is intriguing, and of all the
laws considered here, it is the only language that suggests a policy that
links beauty to those who are suffering, and thus hints that promoting
the arts in some way promotes social justice.
A pragmatic interpretation of Scarry's theory takes that step with
more certainty and offers a fresh argument to support legislation that
has lost support in recent decades. 184 Government sponsorship of the
arts is justified because artistic beauty can promote justice. The more
society is exposed to things of beauty, the greater the chance that observers will be drawn to their symmetry and think less about themselves. As this happens, and as those observers additionally experience
protective and imitative urges, their sense of justice will be enriched,
perhaps to the point where they will turn their attention to the needs
of others.
Conclusion
This Article's instrumental thesis attempts to take beauty off its
pedestal and put it to work. It suggests a way to justice that should be
given a chance. There is no suggestion here that beauty is the sole
path toward justice, or that it is the most important of numerous
paths; certainly other conceptions of justice with their own practical
implications exist. What is offered, with Scarry's insight and with appreciative nods to Dewey and Weil, is a means-ends proposal, drawn
from the connection between beauty and justice, along with a few
182.

Id. at 7, as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2096; see also 20 U.S.C. § 952 (a), (b)

(2000).
183.
184.

S. REP. No. 90-1103, at 7, as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2096.
See Spyke, supra note 129, at 245-50.
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ideas of how that connection can provide a policy boost for laws that
deal with beauty in one way or another.
In order to think in this way we need to place human-made
beauty within the realm of experience and recognize, as Dewey did,
that artistic beauty arises out of ordinary, everyday life. We also need
to acknowledge, as Scarry has, that the experience of natural and artifactual beauty within our surroundings helps to root us within our
communities and make us agents of justice. And we need to understand, as Weil did, thatjustice can begin with the sensibilities and little
acts of individuals who are moved to treat the afflicted with compassion. Scarry shows us that beauty has a utility. That utility can further
justify laws that protect and promote natural and artifactual beauty,
laws that often offer weak or conclusory rationales.
Aesthetic regulation and nuisance, NEPA and SEQRA, and the
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act, have been singled out as laws whose policies could be enriched if expanded to embrace the connection between beauty and justice. There are other
laws that could similarly benefit, most obviously historic preservation
laws, laws that promote public art, and state education laws that mandate arts and environmental education. The beauty-justice connection
stands ready to support other laws as well. Policymakers should consider the contribution beauty can make, not just to the observer's
spirit, to the public welfare, or even to the nation's global status and
economy, but to justice.
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